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ABSTRACT 
We are often told that fake news is the price we pay for a free society, or that fake news is part of the “marketplace 
of ideas.”  Indeed, most arguments against any kind of regulation of fake news—and even some arguments in 
favor—rest on the presumption that lies, distortions, and fabrications are part of the marketplace metaphor.  This 
Article challenges that presumption.  Since the phrase was coined, the “marketplace of ideas” was always about 
ideas, not facts, and the law has always treated facts and feelings or opinions about those facts differently.  Current 
interpretations that expand the First Amendment from ideas to facts are not only ahistorical and wrong.  They are 
also complicit in the erosion of the body politic brought on by fake news. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Fake news is a new name for an old problem.1  Disinformation, misinfor-
mation, hoaxes, conspiracy theories, and lies have long tried to influence 
public opinion.  Fake news is enjoying another moment in the national dis-
course today because its proliferation on online social networks may have 
influenced a national election.2  Therefore, scholars, thought leaders, and 
even online platforms themselves have started to study fake news, its impacts, 
and its corrosive effect on the body politic.3 
Fake news is a complex social problem with a variety of solutions.  Indus-
try prefers market-based or technological solutions.  But relying only on fi-
nancial incentive structures gets at a small fraction of the fake news out 
there,4 as will algorithmic approaches, which also have their own troubling 
consequences.5  Some legal scholars have called for further deregulation of 
	
 1 In the United States, newspapers developed as an adjunct to printing businesses.  Until the lead-up 
to the Revolutionary War, these small printed pamphlets were hyper-local and relatively apolitical.  
See Charles E. Clark & Charles Wetherell, The Measure of Maturity: The Pennsylvania Gazette, 1728–
1765, 46 WM. & MARY Q. 279, 292–93 (1989) (stating that out of over 1,900 pieces published by 
the Gazette between 1728 and 1765, only 1.8% actually touched on politics).  See generally MICHAEL 
SCHUDSON, THE SOCIOLOGY OF NEWS 26–83 (2d ed. 2011) (discussing the historical evolution of 
news in America through the development of the Internet).  But in the early Republic, newspapers 
emerged as intensely partisan mouthpieces of dominant political parties: first, the Federalists and 
the Democratic-Republicans, and later, the Democrats (of the Jacksonian variety).  These papers 
were biased, and unabashedly so, often making up false, and by some standards, libelous stories 
about political opponents.  Id. at 66–69.  Norms of neutrality—and honest reporting—are relatively 
recent phenomena.  See Michael Schudson, The Objectivity Norm in American Journalism, 2 JOURNALISM 
149 (2001) (tracing the development of objectivity in American journalism). 
 2 Facebook and Twitter played an outsized role in spreading fake news during the 2016 presidential 
campaign in the United States.  And because of their reach—44% of U.S. adults get their news from 
Facebook—fake news had a significant impact on campaign discourse.  Jeffrey Gottfried & Elisa 
Shearer, News Use Across Social Media Platforms 2016, PEW RES. CTR. (May 26, 2016), http://www. 
journalism.org/2016/05/26/news-use-across-social-media-platforms-2016/.  Although it is hard to 
argue with the proposition that fake news had an effect on campaign discourse, whether it impacted 
the election’s outcome is far less clear.  Election results are influenced by a multitude of factors; fake 
news may have been one.  That discussion is beyond the scope of this Article. 
 3 On February 17–18, 2017, Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government, Northeastern 
University’s NULab for Texts, Maps, and Networks, and Northeastern University’s Network Sci-
ence Institute jointly hosted a conference entitled, “Combating Fake News: An Agenda for Re-
search and Action.”  The conference brought together a diverse group of lawyers, social scientists, 
technologists, and industry representatives, all of whom agreed that fake news needs to be discussed 
and addressed.  See David Lazer et al., Combating Fake News: An Agenda for Research and Action (May 2, 
2017, 11:45 AM), https://shorensteincenter.org/combating-fake-news-agenda-for-research/ (de-
tailing how fake news spreads and offering solutions to its spread). 
 4 See Mark Verstraete, Derek E. Bambauer & Jane R. Bambauer, Identifying and Countering Fake News 18 
(Ariz. Legal Studies, Discussion Paper No. 17-15, 2017), http://ssrn.com/abstract=3007971 (noting 
that a “market-based solution is likely to be under-inclusive because it does not reach the incentives 
that power trolling and propaganda,” which are both “strongly motivated by nonfinancial incentives”). 
 5 See, e.g., Brett Frischmann & Evan Selinger, Utopia?: A Technologically Determined World of Frictionless 
Transactions, Optimized Production, and Maximal Happiness, 64 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 372 (2016) 
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online platforms as a means of incentivizing those platforms to address the 
problem on their own.6  That counterintuitive proposal forces us to trust that 
Facebook will regulate itself, even though we know it won’t,7 and flies in the 
face of what we know motivates online social networks to moderate content 
in the first place.8  Others have proposed social solutions, like increased me-
dia literacy or bolstering better news sources.9  But those take time, cannot 
reach everyone, and may not have any effect on the proliferation of lies, ru-
mor, and conspiracies.10  Given the inadequacies of these proposals, some 
experts have proposed legal interventions to address the dangers of fake 
news.11  But these legal weapons, we are told, run up against constitutional 
barriers—namely, the First Amendment.12 
Civil libertarians argue that fake news is part of the price we pay for a 
free society.  It is part of the marketplace of ideas, a phrase that, although 
coined almost in passing in Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’s dissent in Abrams 
v. United States,13 has arguably become one of the most powerful governing 
	
(arguing that the increasing use of artificial intelligence to outsource human work raises concerns 
about free will).  
 6 See Verstraete, Bambauer & Bambauer, supra note 4, at 22–24 (“Overall, there is a consensus in the 
United States that the information ecosystem is best served by limiting liability, not increasing it.”). 
 7 See Sandy Parakilas, Opinion, We Can’t Trust Facebook to Regulate Itself, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 19, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/19/opinion/facebook-regulation-incentive.html (opining that 
profit maximization incentivizes companies to collect data rather than police it). 
 8 See Kate Klonick, The New Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes Governing Online Speech, 131 HARV. 
L. REV. 1598, 1625–29 (2018) (discussing the influence of free speech norms, corporate governance, 
and user norms on social media platforms’ moderation of content).  Klonick suggests that platforms 
already have some market incentives to moderate content, but she also proposes law reform to that 
end that tighten regulation in the gaps.  De-regulation won’t help. 
 9 See Nicholas Lemann, Solving the Problem of Fake News, NEW YORKER (Nov. 30, 2016), 
https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/solving-the-problem-of-fake-news (suggesting that 
more rigorous fact-checking could help alleviate the spread of fake news). 
 10 See, e.g., Sonia Livingstone, Media Literacy and the Challenge of New Information and Communication Tech-
nologies, 7 COMM. REV. 3 (2004) (discussing, among other things, the challenges of teaching media 
literacy in the Internet Age). 
 11 See, e.g., Callum Borchers, How the Federal Trade Commission Could (Maybe) Crack Down on Fake News, 
WASH. POST: FIX (Jan. 30, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/01/ 
30/how-the-federal-trade-commission-could-maybe-crack-down-on-faknews/?utm_term=.af5edf 
10ef24 (explaining how Federal Trade Commission regulation of fake news as commercial speech 
could conform with United States Supreme Court precedent). 
 12 In addition to potential First Amendment concerns, there are also statutory barriers.  For example, 
holding platforms liable for third-party content would likely require changes to Section 230 of the 
Communications Decency Act, which immunizes websites from almost all lawsuits associated with 
hosted content.  See Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012).  And given 
congressional gridlock, the likelihood of Congress proposing and voting on any changes to Section 
230 is slim.  See THOMAS E. MANN & NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, IT’S EVEN WORSE THAN IT LOOKS: 
HOW THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM COLLIDED WITH THE NEW POLITICS OF 
EXTREMISM 3–30 (2012) (describing Congress’s paralysis during the fight over the 2011 budget); see 
also SARAH A. BINDER, STALEMATE: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF LEGISLATIVE GRIDLOCK 
23–25 (2003) (discussing the relationship between hyperpartisanship and congressional gridlock). 
 13 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
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analogies in First Amendment law.  It holds, in short, that the only way for 
democratic society to determine the best idea among many is to let ideas fight 
it out in the field: “[T]he best test of truth is the power of the thought to get 
itself accepted in the competition of the market,” Holmes wrote.14  Good 
ideas, like the best products, will win out and bad ideas, like inferior, faulty, 
or poorly made products, will be tossed aside.  Getting the state involved in 
any capacity in the fight against fake news, the argument goes, runs afoul of 
this most basic free speech principle of nonintervention and tolerance.  Re-
quiring changes in platform design, applying a consumer protection agenda, 
or using the law to intervene in any other way to address online social net-
works’ complicity in the spread of fake news runs up against this barrier. 
In response, some scholars argue that First Amendment doctrine permits state 
regulation of fake news even within the marketplace of ideas metaphor.  After all, 
sometimes markets fail.  And when they do, the state steps in to fix it, whether 
through forced disclosures, consumer protections, or even more draconian 
measures.  Fake news is a market failure, an example of falsehoods rising to the 
top due to information asymmetries and the inability of consumers to discern 
good ideas from bad.15  Government intervention, therefore, makes sense. 
This response, though persuasive, misses the point.  It commits an epis-
temic error.  To suggest that the proliferation of fake news represents a break-
down in a market where consumers trade ideas is to presume that fake news 
concerns ideas about which the public can debate.  It doesn’t.  Fake news does 
not concern ideas.  It concerns facts.  And the law treats ideas about facts and 
facts themselves differently.  So, too, does the marketplace of ideas analogy, 
which does not and was never meant to apply to basic facts.  Therefore, I 
argue that the marketplace of ideas metaphor does not apply to fake news.  If 
civil libertarians would like to use the First Amendment to stand in the way of 
using the law to stop fake news, they need to deploy a different doctrine.16 
This Article proceeds as follows.  Part I defines fake news, provides his-
torical context to the problem, and identifies its effects on public discourse as 
	
 14 Id.  
 15 See, e.g., Noah Feldman, Opinion, Closing the Safe Harbor for Libelous Fake News, BLOOMBERG: VIEW 
(Dec. 16, 2016, 12:24 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2016-12-16/free-speech-
libel-and-the-truth-after-pizzagate (discussing the so-called “Pizzagate” scandal while comparing 
European models of regulating fake news to potential legal remedies for libel in the United States); 
Noah Feldman, Opinion, Fake News May Not Be Protected Speech, BLOOMBERG: VIEW (Nov. 23, 2016 
1:22 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2016-11-23/fake-news-may-not-be-pro-
tected-speech. 
 16 Exactly how we should use law to address the fake news problem will be the subject of my forth-
coming scholarship, Network (Fake) News.  I will show that the spread of fake news is a designed-in 
aspect of online social network platforms.  Therefore, I argue that the common law of products 
liability for design defects offers lawyers and legal scholars several principles for structuring a legal 
response to fake news. 
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the central problem to address.  This Part also describes the marketplace of 
ideas metaphor and lays out the conventional belief that fake news is a part 
of that marketplace.  Part II reviews some of the proposals to address the 
problem of fake news and argues that the marketplace of ideas analogy is a 
powerful barrier to implementation.  Part III challenges the application of 
the marketplace of ideas principles to fake news, arguing that the market-
place of ideas was never meant to include facts.  Nor should it.  I conclude 
with a summary and avenues for future research. 
I.  THE PROBLEM OF FAKE NEWS 
Fake news, which I define as misinformation designed to mislead readers 
by looking like and coming across as traditional media,17 is similar to much 
older forms of misinformation.  Biased newspapers affiliated with political 
parties in the early Republic frequently printed misleading articles.18  In 
1925, Harper’s Magazine published a piece titled “Fake News and the 
Public.”19  And a significant portion of the U.S. population believed stories 
suggesting that President Franklin Roosevelt was either in on or at least knew 
about the Japanese plan to bomb Pearl Harbor.20  We have tolerated it for 
so long, the argument goes, because it is the price we pay for a free society.  
Letting people lie to and mislead us, coupled with our ability to discern a 
statesman from a charlatan (if that is indeed what we want), is what 
democracy is all about.  In this Part, I discuss the problems associated with 
the spread of fake news.  I then describe how fake news fits into the 
marketplace of ideas analogy. 
	
 17 This definition brings together the views of several scholars, all of whom are still struggling to define 
fake news.  Some definitions are expansive.  For example, the economists Hunt Allcott and Mat-
thew Gentzkow define it as “news articles that are intentionally and verifiably false, and could mis-
lead readers.”  Hunt Allcott & Matthew Gentzkow, Social Media and Fake News in the 2016 Election, 
31 J. ECON. PERSP. 211, 213 (2017).  They purposely include satire “that could be misunderstood 
as factual . . . .”  Id.  Mark Verstraete, Derek Bambauer, and Jane Bambauer argue that separating 
out different kinds of fake news, based on origin, intent to deceive, and motive to create, is essential 
in order to identify solutions to a multifaceted problem.  See Verstraete, Bambauer & Bambauer, 
supra note 4, at 5–10.  They would exclude satire from an umbrella definition.  Id. at 5.  
 18 SCHUDSON, supra note 1, at 66–72.  
 19 Edward McKernon, Fake News and the Public, 151 HARPER’S MAG., Oct. 1925, at 528. 
 20 See KARLYN BOWMAN & ANDREW RUGG, AM. ENTER. INST. FOR PUB. POLICY RESEARCH, AEI 
PUBLIC OPINION STUDIES: PUBLIC OPINION ON CONSPIRACY THEORIES 10 (2013), http://www. 
aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/-public-opinion-on-conspiracy-theories_181649218739.pdf 
(demonstrating that 31% of those surveyed in a 1991 Gallup poll responded that they “agree” that 
President Roosevelt knew in advance about the bombing of Pearl Harbor, and 18% of those sur-
veyed in a 1971 Harris poll responded that “a conspiracy involving President Roosevelt, who 
wanted an excuse to go to war with Germany and provoked Japan into attacking the U.S.,” was a 
cause of World War II). 
	
850 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 20:4 
A.  Harms to Society 
Although some misinformation can be relatively innocuous—Are there 
really only six simple steps to a slim waistline and six-pack abs?21—fake news 
has significant social costs.  First, falsehoods dressed up as truth directly reduce 
voter knowledge of basic facts, which is already on the decline.22  Second, fake 
news corrodes public discourse by creating the circumstances necessary for 
narratives of false equivalencies.  If every statement is given equal weight, no 
matter how demonstrably false, then it becomes possible, in the name of 
journalistic neutrality, to have news segments devoted to one candidates’ 
bankruptcies (true) 23 and another candidates’ leadership of a pedophilia ring 
(not true).24  And because of the way we process information, once a story is 
heard, even retractions are ill equipped to change our minds.25  Third, and 
	
 21 See, e.g., David Barr, Get 6-Pack Abs in 6 Simple Moves, MUSCLE & FITNESS, https://www.muscleandfit-
ness.com/workouts/abs-and-core-exercises/get-six-pack-abs-6-moves (last visited Feb. 11, 2018). 
 22 See THE ECONOMIST & YOUGOV, THE ECONOMIST/YOUGOV POLL: DECEMBER 17–20, 2016–
1376 US ADULTS 58 (2016) https://d25d2506sfb94s.cloudfront.net/cumulus_uploads/docu-
ment/ljv2ohxmzj/econTabReport.pdf (showing that in 2016, 42% of self-identified Republicans 
still believed former President Barack Obama was born in Kenya); see also Kathy Frankovic, Belief 
in Conspiracies Largely Depends on Political Identity, YOUGOV (Dec. 27, 2016, 2:34 AM), https://to-
day.yougov.com/news/2016/12/27/belief-conspiracies-largely-depends-political-iden/ (showing 
that in December 2016, 46% of Trump voters thought it was either “definitely true” or “probably 
true” that leaked emails from Hillary Clinton’s campaign “talked about pedophilia and human 
trafficking—‘Pizzagate’”).  See generally Press Release, Annenberg Pub. Pol’y Ctr., Americans Know 
Surprisingly Little About Their Government, Survey Finds (Sept. 17, 2014), http://www.annen-
bergpublicpolicycenter.org/americans-know-surprisingly-little-about-their-government-survey-
finds/ (showing that Americans are largely ignorant of basic facts about government).   
 23 See Michelle Lee, Fact Check: Has Trump Declared Bankruptcy Four or Six Times?, WASH. POST (Sept. 26, 
2016, 9:58 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2016/live-updates/general-election/ 
real-time-fact-checking-and-analysis-of-the-first-presidential-debate/fact-check-has-trump-de-
clared-bankruptcy-four-or-six-times/?utm_term=.a506243aca8f (reporting that Donald Trump’s 
companies have filed for bankruptcy six times). 
 24 See Cecilia Kang, Fake News Onslaught Targets Pizzeria as Nest of Child-Trafficking, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 
21, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/21/technology/fact-check-this-pizzeria-is-not-a-
child-trafficking-site.html?_r=1 (explaining the false story that Hillary Clinton was running a pedo-
phile sex ring out of the back room of a pizza shop in Washington, D.C.).  Indeed, four of the five 
most widely-shared fake news stories in the three months leading up to the November election all 
targeted Secretary Clinton, including stories that she sold weapons to ISIS, that she is disqualified 
from holding office, and that she was helped by an FBI agent’s murder-suicide.  See generally Craig 
Silverman, This Analysis Shows How Viral Fake Election News Stories Outperformed Real News on Facebook, 
BUZZFEED NEWS (Nov. 16, 2016, 5:15 PM), https://www.buzzfeed.com/craigsilverman/viral-
fake-election-news-outperformed-real-news-on-facebook?utm_term=.yok7YmL00#.ikMD1Nd22 
(explaining that fake news dominated social media closer to the election). 
 25 See, e.g., Lynn Hasher, David Goldstein & Thomas Toppino, Frequency and the Conference of Referential 
Validity, 16 J. VERBAL LEARNING & VERBAL BEHAV. 107, 111–12 (1977) (explaining that people 
are heavily influenced by the first version of a story they hear); see also Norbert Schwarz et al., 
Metacognitive Experiences and the Intricacies of Setting People Straight: Implications for Debiasing and Public In-
formation Campaigns, 39 ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCH. 127, 152 (2007) (reaffirming 
through research that memory does not serve to distinguish between true and false details). 
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relatedly, in a world where news consumers cannot tell the difference between 
true and false, fake news reduces trust in traditional media, making it difficult 
for true stories to have impact.  Again, there is already evidence that this is 
happening.26  And, finally, fake news contributes to political polarization, 
which breeds divisiveness and erodes social solidarity.  We are psychologically 
primed to accept without question new information that confirms our 
prejudices and previous knowledge or assumptions.27  Highly politicized fake 
news, which tends to sensationalize political narratives, hardens those silos by 
playing into our confirmation biases.  
These effects are interrelated, creating a feedback loop that could damage 
democracy.  Low-information voters, kept uninformed by falsehoods and 
narratives of false equivalencies, harden their political biases by selecting 
media that confirm their previous beliefs, regardless of whether those media 
report true or fake stories.  This increases polarization, which both erodes 
trust in traditional reporting and further encourages selection of confirming 
media.  Fake news is a self-reinforcing problem. 
B.  In the Marketplace 
Despite these dangers, we tolerate fake news as part of the marketplace 
of ideas.  At least, that is what we are told.  The metaphor’s underlying notion 
is that, like a free market in goods, where consumer demand helps the best 
products rise to the top, a democratic public sphere with the free exchange 
of ideas will let the best ideas prevail.  This principle predates Holmes’s met-
aphor and represents a foundational element of the liberal state.28 
When Holmes stated that “the ultimate good desired is better reached by 
free trade in ideas—that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to 
get itself accepted in the competition of the market”29—he was echoing cen-
turies-old philosophy.  In the Areopagitica, John Milton wrote, “Let [Truth] 
	
 26 See Art Swift, Americans’ Trust in Mass Media Sinks to New Low, GALLUP (Sept. 14, 2016), 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/195542/americans-trust-mass-media-sinks-new-low.aspx (showing 
that trust in the accuracy and fairness of media reports was down 8% from the previous year). 
 27 See, e.g., Alessandro Bessi et al., Science vs Conspiracy: Collective Narratives in the Age of Misinformation, 10 
PLOS ONE 1, 9 (2015), http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article/file?id=10.1371/journal.pone. 
0118093&type=printable (concluding that polarized communities rise up around conspiracy theory 
posts on Facebook); Delia Mocanu et al., Collective Attention in the Age of (Mis)Information, 51 
COMPUTERS HUM. BEHAV. 1198, 1199 (2015) (finding that while “normative social influence” and 
“the coherence with the [consumer’s] individual system of beliefs” affected “[t]he process of ac-
ceptance of a claim,” a claim’s origin or whether it was substantiated did not). 
 28 See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 71 (1971) (suggesting that where there are differing 
ideas in the market, the most worthy ideas will become more highly valued); MICHAEL J. SANDEL, 
LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 25 (2d ed. 1998) (arguing that abundance of ideas leads 
to more rational and equal choices). 
 29 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
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and Falshood grapple; who ever knew Truth put to the wors, in a free and 
open encounter.”30  Similarly, John Stuart Mill, also part of the same intel-
lectual tradition, argued that censorship “robb[ed] the human race.”31  In-
stead of silencing bad speech, Mill wrote, put it out in the open so it can be 
denounced and proved wrong.  “If the opinion is right,” censorship deprives 
us “of the opportunity of exchanging error for truth: if wrong, [the opinion 
will] lose, what is almost as great a benefit, the clearer perception and livelier 
impression of truth, produced by its collision with error.”32 
The marketplace rhetoric gives the metaphor an economic flavor, in par-
ticular, the neoclassical economic assumptions of frictionless exchange.  De-
bates over ideas, like competition between different toothpastes or sweaters, 
will eventually identify the best quality ideas (or toothpastes or sweaters) on 
the assumptions that everyone has access to all necessary information about 
those products, that there are no transaction costs to selection, and that indi-
viduals actually have the capacity to identify and choose.33  Richard Posner 
praised this approach, calling the “Darwinian test” for ideas far superior to 
a “centrally managed” economy in thought.34  And Aaron Director, a found-
ing law and economics theorist, noted that, like the rationale for free markets 
in goods, “[t]he traditional defense of the free market in ideas has in the main 
also been utilitarian.”35  To Holmes and his intellectual descendants, then, 
free speech deserves constitutional protection because the free flow of ideas 
creates competition that allows the best ideas to succeed and the worst ideas 
to fail.36  Government intervention identifying favored ideas would short-cir-
cuit this debate and, much like state interference in the free trade of com-
modities, cause inefficiencies, erode choice, and limit freedom. 
As a number of First Amendment scholars have noted, the marketplace 
of ideas metaphor has dominated the Supreme Court’s free speech 
jurisprudence.37  After Holmes introduced the metaphor in 1919, Justice 
Brandeis, who joined in Holmes’s Abrams dissent, reiterated the marketplace 
of ideas principle in his concurrence in the 1927 case, Whitney v. California.38  
Brandeis wrote that when bad or dangerous ideas find their way into the 
	
 30 JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA 167 (1644). 
 31  JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 35 (2d ed. 1863). 
 32 Id. at 35–36.  
 33 See infra notes 55–58 and accompanying text. 
 34 RICHARD POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 115 (1990). 
 35 Aaron Director, The Parity of the Economic Market Place, 7 J.L. & ECON. 1, 8 (1964). 
 36 See R. H. Coase, Advertising and Free Speech, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 27 (1977) (“The rationale of the First 
Amendment is that only if any idea is subject to competition in the marketplace can it be discov-
ered . . . whether it is false or not.”). 
 37 See, e.g., Joseph Blocher, Institutions in the Marketplace of Ideas, 57 DUKE L.J. 821, 830–32 (2008) (ex-
amining the Supreme Court’s remedial decision to accord more speech when falsehoods or bad 
ideas persist). 
 38 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
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public sphere, as with speech intended to incite or encourage the violent 
overthrow of the government, “the remedy to be applied is more speech, not 
enforced silence.”39  Landmark free speech Supreme Court opinions since, 
including, but not limited to, Board of Education v. Pico,40 Consolidated Edison Co. 
of New York v. Public Service Commission,41 Bigelow v. Virginia,42 Miami Herald 
Publishing Co. v. Tornillo,43 Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,44 National Endowment 
for the Arts v. Finley,45 Reno v. ACLU,46 and Virginia v. Hicks,47 all leverage the 
marketplace rhetoric when discussing the scope and reach of First 
Amendment protections.48   
	
 39 Id.  
 40 457 U.S. 853, 866–67 (1982) (plurality opinion) (“Our precedents have focused ‘not only on the role 
of the First Amendment in fostering individual self-expression but also on its role in affording the 
public access to discussion, debate, and the dissemination of information and ideas.’  And we have 
recognized that ‘the State may not, consistently with the spirit of the First Amendment, contract the 
spectrum of available knowledge.’  In keeping with this principle, we have held that in a variety of 
contexts ‘the Constitution protects the right to receive information and ideas.’ . . . ‘The dissemination 
of ideas can accomplish nothing if otherwise willing addressees are not free to receive and consider 
them.  It would be a barren marketplace of ideas that had only sellers and no buyers.’” (first quoting 
First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978); then quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 
381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965); then quoting Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969); and then 
quoting Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 308 (1965) (Brennan, J., concurring))).  
 41 447 U.S. 530, 537–38 (1980) (“If the marketplace of ideas is to remain free and open, governments 
must not be allowed to choose ‘which issues are worth discussing or debating . . . .’” (quoting Police 
Dept. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972))). 
 42 421 U.S. 809, 826 (1975) (“The relationship of speech to the marketplace of products or of services 
does not make it valueless in the marketplace of ideas.”). 
 43 418 U.S. 241, 248 (1974) (“A true marketplace of ideas existed in which there was relatively easy 
access to the channels of communication.”). 
 44 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (“It is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited 
marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail, rather than to countenance monopoli-
zation of that market, whether it be by the Government itself or a private licensee.” (citing Associ-
ated Press v. U.S., 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945))). 
 45 524 U.S. 569, 587 (1998) (“[A] more pressing constitutional question would arise if Government 
funding resulted in the imposition of a disproportionate burden calculated to drive ‘certain ideas or 
viewpoints from the marketplace.’” (quoting Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State 
Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 116 (1991))). 
 46 521 U.S. 844, 885 (1997) (referring to the growth of the Internet as a “dramatic expansion of this 
new marketplace of ideas”). 
 47 539 U.S. 113, 119 (2003) (“Many persons . . . will choose simply to abstain from protected 
speech . . . harming not only themselves but society as a whole, which is deprived of an uninhibited 
marketplace of ideas.” (citing Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486–87 (1965))). 
 48 See generally Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L. J. 1, 6–7 (1984) 
(discussing in more depth the reach of the marketplace of ideas metaphor).  Indeed, the metaphor 
is so pervasive that a Westlaw search for the phrase “marketplace of ideas” conducted on February 
11, 2018, revealed 427 Supreme Court and federal courts of appeals cases.  That number more 
than doubled (877) when federal district courts were included.  
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It is hard to overstate the impact of the marketplace of ideas metaphor.  It 
is not only a conceptual framework.  The marketplace of ideas is the principle 
behind the law of content neutrality.  Generally, the First Amendment does 
not permit the state to restrict categories of speech specifically because of the 
effects such censorship can have on the marketplace of ideas.  The Court 
comes back to this idea regularly.  In R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,49 for example, a 
case that involved state restrictions on hate speech, the Court said that the 
“rationale of the general prohibition [of content discrimination] . . . is that 
content discrimination ‘raises the specter that the Government may effectively 
drive certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace.’”50  In Board of Education 
v. Pico,51 the Court responded to an attempt by a school board to censor public 
school libraries by noting that the “Constitution does not permit the official 
suppression of ideas. . . . To permit such intentions to control official actions 
would be to encourage the precise sort of officially prescribed orthodoxy 
unequivocally condemned . . . .”52  And in Police Department v. Mosley,53 the 
Court made the connection between content neutrality and the marketplace 
of ideas explicit: 
[A]bove all else, the First Amendment means that government has no power 
to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or 
its content.  To permit the continued building of our politics and culture, 
and to assure self-fulfillment for each individual, our people are guaranteed 
the right to express any thought, free from government censorship.  The 
essence of this forbidden censorship is content control.  Any restriction on 
expressive activity because of its content would completely undercut the 
“profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues 
should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.”54 
This makes clear that the marketplace of ideas sits behind the First Amend-
ment’s hands-off doctrines.  It is this laissez-faire approach that makes regu-
lating fake news so difficult: any attempt to stop fake news, the argument 
goes, inhibits a public sphere that is supposed to be robust, active, and free 
of government intervention. 
The marketplace metaphor, however, has faced substantial criticism, 
much of which is directed at the neoclassical economic mirage underpinning 
it.  From the left, Stanley Ingber called the metaphor “as flawed as the 
	
 49 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (holding that the state statute at issue failed due to existence of alternatives 
neutral to content). 
 50 Id. at 387–88 (quoting Simon & Schuster, Inc., 502 U.S. at 116). 
 51 457 U.S. 853 (1982). 
 52 Id. at 870–71 (emphasis omitted).  
 53 408 U.S. 92 (1972) (plurality opinion) (finding a law that failed to distinguish between labor picket-
ing and other forms of picketing to be unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment). 
 54 Id. at 95–96 (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)). 
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economic market.”55  It ignores what makes us human: our altruism, bigotry, 
panic, luck, culture, privilege, and so forth.56  It tends to ignore marginalized 
populations and entrench powerful interests.57  It misses the fact that 
participants in marketplaces have imperfect abilities, including the abilities 
to discern truth from falsehood and to understand how to figure out the 
difference in the first place.58  Behavioral economists have demonstrated 
many of those flaws empirically.59  
Like economists, adherents to the marketplace of ideas metaphor re-
sponded to these criticisms by noting that even under neoclassical theory, 
sometimes markets fail.  First Amendment law is replete with market failures, 
if not in so many words.  For example, we do not give First Amendment 
protection to, among other things, true threats,60 incitements to violence,61 
or yelling fire in a crowded theatre,62 the last of which is an early example of 
fake news.  The Supreme Court has stated that state intervention to counter 
these forms of expression passes constitutional muster in part because the 
evils they target do not add any good ideas to the marketplace.  For example, 
in Miller v. California,63 the Court denied First Amendment protection to ob-
scene speech, stating that, like fighting words, obscenities are “no essential 
part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to 
truth than any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed 
by the social interest in order and morality.”64  The same is true for speech 
	
 55 Ingber, supra note 48, at 16–17. 
 56 Paul H. Brietzke, How and Why the Marketplace of Ideas Fails, 31 VAL. U. L. REV. 951, 962–63 (1997). 
 57 See Blocher, supra note 37, at 832–33. 
 58 See id. 
 59 Behavioral economics argues that rational choice theory does not accurately describe how consum-
ers behave in markets.  Economic actors are not automatons, always acting rationally and engaging 
in markets without transaction costs.  They are, instead, humans, with cognitive limitations and 
biases who enter markets with opportunity and transaction costs as well as very little of the infor-
mation they would normally need to make perfectly rational decisions.  The seminal law review 
article on behavioral economics is Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral 
Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998).  See also, e.g., Oren Bar-Gill, The Behav-
ioral Economics of Consumer Contracts, 92 MINN. L. REV. 749 (2008); Cass R. Sunstein, Boundedly Ra-
tional Borrowing, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 249 (2006). 
 60 Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707 (1969) (per curiam) (deciding that the threat at issue, 
made in opposition to the military draft, was merely “political hyperbole” and did not constitute an 
actionable true threat). 
 61 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (upholding a New Hampshire statute 
prohibiting the use of offensive language against another in public, finding it to be sufficiently nar-
row in its scope). 
 62 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (finding that defendants’ political leaflets, pro-
duced and distributed during wartime, could be punishable due to the “clear and present danger” 
they posed under the circumstances). 
 63 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (reaffirming that obscenity is not constitutionally protected speech, and stipu-
lating that obscenity should be defined based on “contemporary community standards” rather than 
a national standard).  
 64 Id. at 20–21 (quoting Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572).  
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that incites a mob to violence65 and, as I have argued elsewhere, for hate and 
harassing speech, which disempowers and silences its targets.66  
Fake news has been reflexively put within the marketplace metaphor.  
Some have called fake news the price we pay for freedom;67 others have fit it 
within the market failure corollary.68  In either case, the metaphor holds.  
And, it would seem, false statements of fact are now protected under the First 
Amendment.  In United States v. Alvarez,69 the Supreme Court declared the 
Stolen Valor Act unconstitutional and overturned a conviction of a man who 
was prosecuted for lying about his service and medal awards in the Marines.  
The plurality opinion by Justice Kennedy held that the Act, which prohibited 
lying about military service, was a content-based restriction on speech, which 
must either pass strict scrutiny or fail Constitutional muster.70  Kennedy was 
generally skeptical of the state’s ability to punish the category of false speech, 
but even if it could, Kennedy wrote, stopping the lies we tell each other does 
not rise to the level of a compelling state interest.71  Kennedy clearly stated 
that “[a]bsent from those few categories where the law allows content-based 
regulation of speech is any general exception to the First Amendment for 
false statements.”72  Although I will argue later this decision misses the mark, 
for now suffice it to say that the marketplace of ideas metaphor rests behind 
both arguments against regulating fake news and those that see fake news as 
a market failure in need of state intervention. 
	
 65 See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 447, 447–48 (1969) (per curiam) (finding that incitements are 
unprotected while advocacy of violence is protected). 
 66 See Ari Ezra Waldman, Triggering Tinker: Student Speech in the Age of Cyberharassment, 71 U. MIAMI L. REV. 
428 (2017).  But see R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992) (noting that the city could not 
prohibit expression that “arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others . . . on the basis of race, color, 
creed, religion, or gender” because such a prohibition constituted viewpoint discrimination). 
 67 See Jay Stanley, Fixing Fake News, ACLU (Dec. 12, 2016, 3:30 PM), https://www.aclu.org/ 
blog/free-speech/internet-speech/fixing-fake-news (suggesting that there is nothing either Face-
book or the state can, or should, do to combat fake news). 
 68 See Feldman, Fake News May Not Be Protected Speech, supra note 15 (arguing that truth may not always 
be able to defeat falsehoods in the marketplace of ideas). 
 69 567 U.S. 709, 723 (2012) (plurality opinion) (“Were the Court to hold that the interest in truthful 
discourse alone is sufficient to sustain a ban on speech, absent any evidence that the speech was 
used to gain a material advantage, it would give government a broad censorial power unprece-
dented in this Court’s cases or in our constitutional tradition.  The mere potential for the exercise 
of that power casts a chill, a chill the First Amendment cannot permit if free speech, thought, and 
discourse are to remain a foundation of our freedom.”). 
 70 Id. at 722–23. 
 71 Id. at 717–23. 
 72 Id. at 718. 
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II.  EVALUATING SOLUTIONS TO FAKE NEWS  
The power of the marketplace of ideas metaphor is evident in the 
proposed technical, market-based, social, and legal responses to the problem 
of fake news.73  Rather than being an exhaustive list, these proposals—and 
their inadequacies—highlight how the First Amendment, in general, and the 
marketplace of ideas analogy, in particular, lurks in the background of the 
debate over fake news. 
A.  Algorithmic and Financial Responses 
On the technical side, some platforms propose taking humans out of the 
equation and outsourcing the task of identifying fake news to artificial 
intelligence.  Computer science scholars are working on this, as well,74 and 
legal scholars have proposed further expanding platform immunity in order 
to incent this kind of self-regulation.75  Some platforms also want to take away 
the financial incentives for fake news.  Macedonian teenagers, for example, 
were paid to create fake news during the 2016 U.S. presidential campaign.76  
As a result, Google announced that it would prohibit fake news websites from 
using AdSense to make money off targeted advertisements.77  Since 
announcing that policy, Google has moved against hundreds of websites.78  
Facebook has plans to do something similar.79 
	
 73 Focusing on these four areas—technical, market-based, social, and legal solutions—consciously re-
lies on Larry Lessig’s classic formulation that law, markets, architecture, and norms constrain be-
havior online.  See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: VERSION 2.0, 123 (2d ed. 2006).  Verstraete, Bam-
bauer, and Bambauer used this same organization in their report on fake news.  See Verstraete, 
Bambauer & Bambauer, supra note 4, at 13–29.  It is a convenient organizational structure for 
considering a variety of tools to combat fake news, but using it does not imply that a potentially 
effective solution could not exist outside these four discrete categories. 
 74 See JACOB RATKIEWICZ ET AL., DETECTING AND TRACKING POLITICAL ABUSE IN SOCIAL MEDIA 
297–304 (2011).  
 75 Verstraete, Bambauer & Bambauer, supra note 4, at 22–24. 
 76 See Samanth Subramanian, Inside the Macedonian Fake-News Complex, WIRED (Feb. 15, 2017), 
https://www.wired.com/2017/02/veles-macedonia-fake-news/ (telling the story of a Macedonian 
teen who pulled himself out of poverty by building websites and using Facebook to  spread fake news). 
 77 See Scott Spencer, How We Fought Bad Ads, Sites and Scammers in 2016, GOOGLE: THE KEYWORD 
(Jan. 25, 2017), https://www.blog.google/topics/ads/how-we-fought-bad-ads-sites-and-scam-
mers-2016/ (explaining the steps Google has taken to fight back against misleading and predatory 
advertisements). 
 78 Tess Townsend, Google Has Banned 200 Publishers Since It Passed a New Policy Against Fake News, 
RECODE (Jan. 25, 2017 9:01 AM), https://www.recode.net/2017/1/25/14375750/google-ad-
sense-advertisers-publishers-fake-news. 
 79 See JEN WEEDON, WILLIAM NULAND & ALEX STAMOS, FACEBOOK, INFORMATION OPERATIONS 
AND FACEBOOK 5 (2017) (laying out plans to solve the problem of fake news in part by disrupting 
the economic incentives to those who profit from it, thereby undermining the operations that are 
financially motivated). 
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These market-based solutions are steps in the right direction, but they are 
not panaceas for a variety of reasons.  First, they fail to capture ideologically 
created fake news, where the incentive is power, not money.  Second, elimi-
nating some of the financial incentives for creating some fake news leaves 
intact the financial incentives social media platforms have to keep infor-
mation spreading.  One of the reasons why platforms are willing to employ 
teams of humans to run content moderation is because they have a financial 
incentive to do so.80  But unlike harassing or violent content, which has the 
effect of depressing engagement,81 fake news generates the clicks, shares, and 
social engagements Facebook, Twitter, and others need in order to make be-
havioral targeting work.  After all, sharing fake news is a strong indicator of 
political affiliation, an aspect of our virtual selves Facebook can use to earn 
advertising dollars from political campaigns, retailers, and even luxury goods.  
Political leanings are good proxies for our other interests.82 
Third, technical design strategies have already proved unsuccessful.  When 
a Gizmodo report suggested that Facebook’s human editors privileged politi-
cally liberal news in its Trending Topics section,83 Facebook responded with 
more automation,84 arguing that the algorithm, the argument went, would not 
have any of the biases of humans.  That, as we know, is not true.  Not only is 
	
 80 See Danielle Keats Citron & Helen Norton, Intermediaries and Hate Speech: Fostering Digital Citizenship 
for Our Information Age, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1435, 1454 (2011) (stating that “[s]ome intermediaries see 
digital hate as a potential threat to profits”); see also Klonick, supra note 8, at 34 (claiming that the 
main reason for removing obscene and violent material is the threat that such speech has on profits). 
 81 See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron, Law’s Expressive Value in Combating Cyber Gender Harassment, 108 MICH. 
L. REV. 373, 391 (2009) (“Online abuse solidifies male dominance of online spaces by eliminating 
and muting women’s voices from the internet.”). 
 82 See, e.g., Amy Friedman, Red and Blue Brands: How Democrats and Republicans Shop, TIME (June 19, 2012), 
http://newsfeed.time.com/2012/06/19/red-and-blue-brands-how-democrats-and-republicans-
shop/ (exploring the differences in consumer behavior between Republicans and Democrats). 
 83 See Michael Nunez, Former Facebook Workers: We Routinely Suppressed Conservative News, GIZMODO (May 
9, 2016, 9:10 AM), http://gizmodo.com/former-facebook-workers-we-routinely-suppressed-con-
ser-1775461006 (displaying journalistic research showing that Facebook workers prevented dissem-
ination of stories of interest to conservative readers). 
 84 See Search FYI: An Update to Trending, FACEBOOK: NEWSROOM (Aug. 26, 2016), https://news-
room.fb.com/news/2016/08/search-fyi-an-update-to-trending/ (announcing a policy change to auto-
mation of the Trending feature on Facebook and an end to reliance on topic summarization by humans). 
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artificial intelligence just as biased as the humans who program it,85 Facebook’s 
automation of Trending Topics only made the problem worse.86 
Moreover, outsourcing human reasoning to a computer is not something 
we should do on a whim, especially given the attendant moral, ethical, and 
political questions.  We now have the technology to let computers make a 
litany of decisions for us, from whom to hire87 to how to move our muscles.88  
And although such technology offers us an extraordinary set of opportunities, 
designers rarely consider its dark side.  As Brett Frischmann and Evan 
Selinger have argued, Silicon Valley’s almost reflexive use of technology and 
artificial intelligence to solve social problems asks us “to dissociate from our 
physicality and objectify our incarnate bodies as mere commodities.”89  This 
	
 85 There is a growing literature on the biases inherent in artificial intelligence, machine learning, and 
algorithmic processing.  See, e.g., Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 
CALIF. L. REV. 671 (2016) (examining how, through the lens of Title VII’s prohibition of discrimi-
nation in employment, the algorithmic techniques used to eliminate human biases fail to do so); 
Aylin Caliskan, Joanna J. Bryson & Arvind Narayanan, Semantics Derived Automatically from Language 
Corpora Contain Human-Like Biases, 356 SCIENCE 183, 183 (2017) (showing “that standard machine 
learning can acquire stereotyped biases from textual data that reflect everyday human culture”); 
Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process for Automated Predictions, 89 
WASH. L. REV. 1 (2014) (arguing for the due process tradition to protect individuals against artifi-
cially intelligent scoring systems that risk biased and arbitrary results); Amanda Levendowski, How 
Copyright Law Can Fix Artificial Intelligence’s Implicit Bias Problem, 93 WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3024938 (examining examples of artificial 
intelligence systems that reflect or exacerbate societal bias through the lens of copyright doctrine); 
Latanya Sweeney, Discrimination in Online Ad Delivery, ACM QUEUE, March 2013, at 2 (finding that 
structural racism can exist in the technology computer scientists design); Kate Crawford, Think 
Again: Big Data, FOREIGN POL’Y (May 10, 2013, 12:40 PM), http://foreignpolicy.com/ 
2013/05/10/think-again-big-data (explaining that big data sets are not immunized from faulty as-
sumptions because they are still designed by humans).  
 86 Trending Topics became infested with fake news, including a story that Megyn Kelly was fired 
from Fox News because she supported Hillary Clinton.  Verstraete, Bambauer & Bambauer, supra 
note 4, at 19. 
 87 See, e.g., Zeynep Tufekci, Algorithmic Harms Beyond Facebook and Google: Emergent Challenges of Computa-
tional Agency, 13 COLO. TECH. L.J. 203, 217 (2015) (“For example, rather than race, a hiring algo-
rithm could discriminate based on correlates of race, which would result in a workforce that ex-
cluded certain racial backgrounds.  This could be done by hiring people based on ‘commuting 
distance to work,’ a factor that companies working on algorithmically calculating the potential suc-
cess of newly hired employees have already found to be correlated to a low-degree of employee 
turnover.  Such a criterion would not directly target race, but given the residential segregation 
patterns in many cities around the United States, could easily effectively do so.”); see also Kevin 
McGowan, Big Bad Data May Be Triggering Discrimination, BIG L. BUS. (Aug. 15, 2016), 
https://biglawbusiness.com/big-bad-data-may-be-triggering-discrimination/ (exploring the fear 
that algorithms can perpetuate discrimination based on race, sex, or other protected characteris-
tics); Dustin Volz, Silicon Valley Thinks It Has the Answer to Its Diversity Problem, ATLANTIC (Sept. 26, 
2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/09/silicon-valley-thinks-it-has-the-an-
swer-to-its-diversity-problem/431334/ (explaining how data mining can perpetuate undetected 
bias because it is based on specific examples rooted in past patterns). 
 88 See Frischmann & Selinger, supra note 5, at 384 (discussing Max Pfeiffer’s research, in which he ma-
nipulated how students navigated through a space by using electrical current to trigger their muscles). 
 89 Id. at 386. 
	
860 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 20:4 
is as true for technologies that make our minds redundant.  Distinguishing 
between real and fake news is the kind of discerning engagement with social 
life that humans are good at, but still a muscle we need to exercise.  But as 
more human agency is erased, the loss of this deep engagement can have 
deleterious effects on politics, policy, and democracy.90  
The marketplace of ideas sits in the background of these market-based 
approaches in two ways.  First, as voluntary industry responses to fake news, 
changes to technology design and financial structures reflect the idea that the 
best response to a problem is often not a governmental one.  Rather, Face-
book and other social platforms may simply be responding to consumer pref-
erences: Consumers may stop using their products if they become infested 
with fake news.  Therefore, attempting to stanch the spread of fake news 
through voluntary adoption of technical design changes may be exactly what 
the marketplace of ideas analogy envisioned. 
Second, online content moderation itself reflects the principles of market-
place of ideas.  In her research on how online platforms developed policies 
regarding third party content, Kate Klonick found that even as platforms like 
Facebook, YouTube, Twitter, and others developed different policies, those 
policies were all written by “American lawyers trained and acculturated in 
American free speech norms and First Amendment law.”91  Those lawyers 
all described how they were conscious of traditional American democratic 
norms, particularly free speech, when writing new policies.92  The integration 
of those principles into systematic policies that determined what their users 
can say online, or which videos remained on YouTube or Twitter and which 
violated their terms of use, reflected an appreciation for the role the free ex-
change of ideas plays in the cultural experience of their user bases.93 
B.  Speech Norms 
Free speech norms online would seem to make countering fake news dif-
ficult, as well.  Our feelings about speech on the Internet are still to some 
extent governed by the cyberlibertarians who dominated early Internet 
scholarship94 and by the first few online speech cases in the federal courts.  
	
 90 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 49 n.55 (1976) (“Democracy depends on a well-informed elec-
torate . . . .”). 
 91 Klonick, supra note 8, at 28. 
 92 Id.  
 93 Id.  at 26–28. 
 94 See Mary Anne Franks, Unwilling Avatars: Idealism and Discrimination in Cyberspace, 20 COLUM. J. 
GENDER & L. 224, 234–37 (2011) (describing how cyberspace idealists consider the Internet as “a 
paradise that needed no externally imposed laws”); see also JACK GOLDSMITH & TIM WU, WHO 
CONTROLS THE INTERNET?: ILLUSIONS OF A BORDERLESS WORLD 17 (2006) (describing John 
Perry Barlow, a cyberlibertarian who reasoned that cyberspace came with its own rules). 
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Early on, the Internet was seen as a true marketplace of ideas, unencumbered 
by legal restrictions, antiquated social norms, or even our bodies.95  John 
Perry Barlow called the Internet “a world where anyone, anywhere may ex-
press his or her beliefs, no matter how singular, without fear of being coerced 
into silence or conformity.”96  Eugene Volokh wrote that the Internet would 
empower end users to bypass intermediaries and filters, like Rupert Murdoch 
and the publisher of The New York Times.97  Kathleen Sullivan agreed: Since 
the Internet was available at home to anyone who could afford a computer 
and a connection, or to anyone who could rent a few minutes of connectivity 
at a cybercafé or drive to the public library to use it for free, there would be 
more speakers and more listeners, and more things said and heard.98 
Congress and the courts cemented these strong free speech norms with 
passage and subsequent interpretations of Section 230 of the Communica-
tions Decency Act.  The provision, which immunizes Internet platforms from 
lawsuits associated with third-party content on their sites, was first offered as 
an amendment by then-Representatives Christopher Cox of California and 
now-Senator Ron Wyden of Oregon99 to keep the marketplace of ideas 
online at its acme.  Congress explicitly stated that it passed the law to preserve 
the Internet as “a forum for a true diversity” of views “with a minimum of 
government regulation,” and to maintain “the vibrant and competitive free 
market that presently exists for the Internet . . . unfettered by Federal or 
State regulation.”100  The metaphor just went digital. 
Congress’s other reason for enacting Section 230 was to encourage Inter-
net intermediaries, users, and parents to self-police the Internet for obscene 
conduct.101  But in interpreting the clause, federal courts cemented broad 
	
 95 The New Yorker expressed this point in one of its famous cartoons.  A dog, sitting at a computer desk, 
looks down at his doggy friend on the floor and says, “On the Internet, nobody knows you’re a dog.”  
Peter Steiner, Cartoon, On the Internet, Nobody Knows You’re a Dog, NEW YORKER, July 5, 1993, at 61. 
 96 John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Feb. 8, 
1996), https://www.eff.org/cyberspace-independence.  Barlow was one of the founders of the Elec-
tronic Frontier Foundation, a libertarian privacy advocacy group.  A History of Protecting Freedom 
Where Law and Technology Collide, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/about/his-
tory (last visited May 9, 2018). 
 97 See Eugene Volokh, Cheap Speech and What It Will Do, 104 YALE L.J. 1805, 1834 (1995) (explaining 
how “[a] speaker need no longer satisfy the intermediaries before being allowed to speak”). 
 98 See Kathleen M. Sullivan, First Amendment Intermediaries in the Age of Cyberspace, 45 UCLA L. REV. 
1653, 1670 (1998) (finding that an abundance of speech can be explained, in part, by the compar-
atively low cost of a personal computer and Internet connection). 
 99 See 141 CONG. REC. H8460–71 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (describing the amendment and why it 
would maintain the marketplace of ideas on the Internet). 
 100 Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. §§ 230(a)(3)–(4), (b)(2) (2012). 
 101 See id. at § 230(b)(4) (describing the desire to “empower parents to restrict their children’s access to 
objectionable or inappropriate online material”); Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 52 
(D.D.C. 1998) (demonstrating how Congress enacted 47 U.S.C. § 230 to remove disincentives to 
self-regulation); 141 CONG. REC. H8469–71 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (statements of Reps. Cox, 
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free speech norms.  In Zeran v. America Online, Inc., for example, the Fourth 
Circuit noted that lawsuits against providers for third-party content would 
risk “freedom of speech in the new and burgeoning Internet medium.”102  In 
a broad holding,103 the court stated that “Section 230 was enacted, in part, 
to maintain the robust nature of Internet communication, and accordingly, 
to keep government interference in the medium to a minimum.”104  There-
fore, although federal courts recognized Section 230’s “Good Samaritan” 
provision,105 their broad immunity decisions expanded the marketplace of 
ideas metaphor to the World Wide Web. 
C.  Legal Interventions and the First Amendment 
Law can also affect norms.  Indeed, law has expressive value that helps 
move public opinion.106  Law can also create incentives for companies to act, 
	
Wyden, and Barton) (advocating legislation to protect children from offensive materials found on 
the Internet).  This is sometimes called the “Good Samaritan” clause.  As Kate Klonick argues, 
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tored and removed such content, Prodigy should be liable for the defamation.  Id. at *1–2.  The 
court agreed.  Because Prodigy took an active role in monitoring its bulletin boards, it was a pub-
lisher for the purposes of state libel laws and could be held liable for defamatory posts.  Id. at *4.  
When it took up Section 230, Congress made clear that it intended to use the section to overrule 
Stratton Oakmont.  See 141 CONG. REC. H8461–70 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (statement of Rep. Cox) 
(referring to disincentives created by the Stratton Oakmont decision); S. REP. NO. 104-230, at 194 
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ceive through interactive computer services.”); see also Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331 (emphasizing that 
Section 230 was adopted to overrule Stratton Oakmont); HARVEY L. ZUCKMAN ET AL., MODERN 
COMMUNICATION LAW 494 (1999) (observing that it is “crystal clear that [Section 230 was] de-
signed to change the result in future cases like Stratton Oakmont”). 
 103 Zeran, 129 F.3d at 328. 
 104 Id. at 330; see also Ben Ezra, Weinstein & Co. v. Am. Online, Inc., 206 F.3d 980, 985 n.3 (10th Cir. 
2000) (elaborating that “[i]t is the policy of the United States . . . to preserve the vibrant and com-
petitive free market that presently exists for the Internet and other interactive computer services, 
unfettered by Federal or State regulation” (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2))). 
 105 Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1027 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding that Section 230 was meant “(1) to 
promote the continued development of the Internet and other interactive computer services and 
other interactive media; (2) to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists 
for the Internet and other interactive computer services, unfettered by Federal or State regulation” 
(citing 47 U.S.C. § 230(b))). 
 106 See, e.g., Citron, supra note 81, at 407 (“Law has an important expressive character beyond its coer-
cive one.  Law creates a public set of meanings and shared understandings between the state and 
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whether on their own or in reaction to lawsuits.  Therefore, some experts 
have argued that a consumer protection agenda would be effective against 
fake news.107  We are told, however, that such state action would run afoul 
of the First Amendment’s protections for falsehoods because falsehoods are 
tolerated in the marketplace of ideas.108  
One way around the marketplace barrier is to suggest that fake news 
overcrowds the marketplace of ideas with lies intended to confuse us, sow 
mistrust, or generally influence our choices.  Left on its own, that marketplace 
will collapse under the weight of falsehoods.  And we have reason to believe 
such a marketplace would collapse.  In a recent study published in Science, 
researchers at the MIT Media Lab looked at Twitter and studied the diffu-
sion of 126,000 true and false stories tweeted by approximately 3 million 
people more than 4.5 million times.109  They classified stories as either true 
or false using six independent fact-checking organizations.  They found that 
false stories diffused “farther, faster, deeper, and more broadly than the truth 
in all categories of information.”110  The truth, in other words, could not rise 
to the top because the marketplace was packed with lies. 
This is the market failure corollary to the marketplace of ideas metaphor.  
In other contexts where information asymmetries in the marketplace prevent 
us from distinguishing quality goods from lemons, consumer protection law 
steps in.  The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”), the federal regulatory 
agency dedicated to protecting consumers from unfair and deceptive busi-
ness practices, has broad regulatory authority to police “unfair or deceptive 
[trade practices].”111  That charge includes holding companies’ feet to the 
	
the public.  It clarifies, and draws attention to, the behavior it prohibits.  Law’s expressed meaning 
serves mutually reinforcing purposes.  Law educates the public about what is socially harmful.  This 
legitimates harms, allowing the harmed party to see herself as harmed.  It signals appropriate behav-
ior.  In drawing attention to socially appropriate behavior, law permits individuals to take these 
social meanings into account when deciding on their actions.  Because law creates and shapes social 
mores, it has an important cultural impact that differs from its more direct coercive effects.” (em-
phasis added) (footnotes omitted)); Alex Geisinger, A Belief Change Theory of Expressive Law, 88 IOWA 
L. REV. 35, 68 (2002) (noting that motorcycle helmet laws impact our belief that helmets make us 
safe); Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338, 
349 (1997) (noting that laws can both intentionally and unintentionally affect social norms); Arti 
Kaur Rai, Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of Science, 94 NW. U. L. 
REV. 77, 86–88 (1999) (noting that behavior and laws are related); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive 
Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2043 (1996) (noting that civil rights laws have had an 
effect on the meaning of nondiscrimination). 
 107 See, e.g., Borchers, supra note 11 (exploring First Amendment protection of political views in the media). 
 108 See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 714–15 (2012) (overturning a conviction under the 
Stolen Valor Act for lying about military service). 
 109  Soroush Vosoughi, Deb Roy & Sinan Aral, The Spread of True and False News Online, 359 SCIENCE 
1146, 1147 (2018). 
 110  Id. 
 111 Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (2012). 
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fire for any representation, omission, or practice that is likely to mislead con-
sumers, and identifying unfair practices as they come up.112  Under these 
doctrines, the FTC has challenged many deceptive practices, including mis-
leading advertising and deceptive product demonstrations,113 both of which 
disrupt our ability to discern good products from bad. 
Commerce is the shibboleth of FTC action.114  And although much of 
the fake news that proliferated throughout the 2016 U.S. presidential elec-
tion looks like political speech at first blush, it is arguably a product like any 
other.  Granted, we do not pay for fake news directly, like we do for a car, 
television, or weight loss pill.  However, even propagandists who traffic in 
fake news are engaged in commerce.  They earn advertising revenue off our 
clicks and shares.  They often sell products on their fake news sites.  They 
can pay Facebook to privilege their posts in followers’ News Feeds.  They are 
also part of a commercial ecosystem that reaches into the hundreds of billions 
of dollars per year. 115  
The deception, then, is intimately tied to the indirect commercial aspects 
of fake news.  Websites that masquerade as purveyors of real news leverage 
the design and structure of online social networks to post articles and bait their 
highly motivated followers to visit their site.  From those visits, they earn val-
uable data and rack up the high traffic necessary for advertising revenue.  
Whether they earn money directly or indirectly, fake news sites commodify 
their visitors into dollars.  Financial connections weaker than this have trig-
gered legal interventions in other areas of law,116 so it is at least arguable that 
	
 112 Woodrow Hartzog, Unfair and Deceptive Robots, 74 MD. L. REV. 785, 812–13 (2015). 
 113 See CHRIS JAY HOOFNAGLE, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION PRIVACY LAW AND POLICY 123–25 
(2016) (explaining the history and power of the Federal Trade Commission); see also Daniel J. Solove 
& Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 583 
(2014) (describing how the Federal Trade Commission enforces companies’ private policies). 
 114 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (empowering the FTC to prevent companies “from using unfair methods of 
competition in or affecting commerce and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce” 
(emphasis added)). 
 115 See Digital Advertising Spending Worldwide from 2015 to 2020 (in Billions U.S. Dollars), STATISTA (2016), 
https://www.statista.com/statistics/237974/online-advertising-spending-worldwide/ (finding that 
advertisement spending “would amount to 229.25 billion U.S. dollars in 2017 and that it would 
grow to 335.5 billion by 2020.”). 
 116 In copyright law, for example, vicarious liability for entities that provide the circumstances neces-
sary for direct infringers to violate third party copyrights requires the right and ability to control 
the infringers’ actions and a financial benefit from the infringement.  But, as several courts have 
held, that financial benefit need not come directly from the sale of infringing goods, but indirectly 
from the broader ecosystem of infringing commerce.  See, e.g., Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, 
Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 263 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that a swap meet that allowed the sale of directly 
infringing goods could be held vicariously liable because, among other things, it earned indirect 
financial benefit from “payment of a daily rental fee by each of the infringing vendors; . . . an ad-
mission fee, and incidental payments for parking, food and other services by customers seeking to 
purchase infringing recordings”).  And, in trademark law, which requires marks be used “in com-
merce” to gain Lanham Act protection, the definition of “in commerce” includes more than merely 
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the FTC Act’s “in commerce” requirement can be triggered by fake news.  
Indeed, the FTC has already moved against websites that designed themselves 
to look like news sites in order to disseminate fake stories about products.117  
Such cases provide a pathway for the FTC to address fake news, as well. 
I am sympathetic to this argument.  But the marketplace of ideas is still 
in the way.  Free speech law is a libertarian triumph;118 the marketplace as it 
stands today has room for almost every kind of statement, including false 
ones.  That is, First Amendment law seems to have decided that fake news is 
not a market failure.  It is true that false statements have been found to have 
little to no First Amendment value.  In Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, for example, 
the Supreme Court stated that “[f]alse statements of fact are particularly val-
ueless [because] they interfere with the truth-seeking function of the market-
place of ideas.”119  And in Brown v. Hartlage, the Court stated explicitly that 
falsehoods “are not protected by the First Amendment in the same manner 
as truthful statements.”120  
But even as it was recognizing the market failure corollary and perhaps 
implying that state intervention might be permissible, the Court cabined its 
rhetoric.  In Hartlage, the Court recognized that an “erroneous statement is 
inevitable in free debate, and . . . it must be protected if the freedoms of ex-
pression are to have the ‘breathing space’ they ‘need . . . to survive.’”121  The 
Court stated the exact same thing in Hustler Magazine.122  Indeed, as the ma-
jority noted in Alvarez, the only times the Court has excluded false statements 
of fact from the marketplace of ideas is when the falsehood was associated 
with some other legally cognizable harm.123  Hustler Magazine concerned def-
amation.124  Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,125 which is quoted in Hustler Magazine, 
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 117 See Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, Marketers of Dietary Supplement Amberen Settle 
FTC Charges Regarding Misleading Weight-Loss and Menopause Relief Claims (May 20, 2016), 
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plaint against the makers of Amberen, a dietary supplement, for deceptive marketing strategies). 
 118 See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 314 (2010) (arguing that the government should stay 
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 119 485 U.S. 46, 52 (1988). 
 120 456 U.S. 45, 60 (1982). 
 121 Id. at 60–61 (first quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271–72 (1964); then quoting 
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)). 
 122 Hustler Magazine, 485 U.S. at 52. 
 123 United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 719–22 (2012). 
 124 Hustler Magazine, 485 U.S. at 47. 
 125 418 U.S. 323, 325 (1974). 
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Hartlage, and other false statement cases, was about libel.126  Another false 
statement case, Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Associates, was about 
fraud.127  Therefore, although a consumer protection agenda might intellec-
tually fit within the market failure corollary, the Court’s strict adherence to 
the marketplace metaphor far beyond its economic underpinnings128 coun-
sels against the constitutionality of FTC intervention. 
III.  CHALLENGING THE MARKETPLACE METAPHOR 
Another way to respond to the marketplace argument is to challenge it head 
on.  We should not reflexively include fake news in the marketplace of ideas, 
even as a market failure.  Indeed, demonstrable falsehoods were never part of 
the intellectual tradition of the metaphor.  To include them now bastardizes the 
doctrine and erodes the very freedoms the First Amendment, as the constitu-
tional manifestation of the marketplace of ideas metaphor, is meant to protect. 
A fact is “[a] thing that is indisputably the case”129 or “something that 
actually exists.”130  Here are some facts: California is a state in the United 
States of America.  A dachshund is breed of dog.  Donald Trump became 
president in January 2017.  Here are some things that are not facts: Califor-
nia is the most desirable state in which to live.  Dachshunds are the best dogs 
to have as pets.  Donald Trump has been a great president.  I might agree or 
disagree with each of the last three statements, but they are not, as tradition-
ally understood, facts.  I can put forth facts to argue in favor or against them.  
I can compare California’s average temperatures, its economic output, the 
health of its residents, and its laws to argue it is the best state.  But anyone 
from New York, Florida, Colorado, or almost any other state could muster 
facts to support an argument that I’m wrong.  And they might be correct. 
Facts are not values.  Values color our impression of facts, create feelings 
about facts, and even determine which facts we think are important.  They 
do not change the facts themselves.  Consider the example of a disagreement 
about which breeds of dogs are the best as pets.  My friends Jim, Patrick, 
Lisa, and Darbi are discussing their views.  Jim, who grew up with golden-
doodles, points out that dachshunds have trouble going up and down steps.  
	
 126 Id. at 327; see also Hustler Magazine, 485 U.S. at 51 (citing Gertz, 418 U.S. at 339); Phila. Newspapers 
v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 768 (1986) (citing Gertz, 418 U.S. at 325, 347); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. 
Greenmoss Builders, Inc. 472 U.S. 749, 760 (1985) (citing Gertz, 418 U.S. at 325, 349); Hartlage, 456 
U.S. at 60 (citing Gertz, 418 U.S. at 340). 
 127 538 U.S. 600, 620 (2003) (“False statement alone does not subject a fundraiser to fraud liability.”). 
 128 See Blocher, supra note 37, at 836–38 (explaining that the Supreme Court has idealized the “mar-
ketplace of ideas” to justify its speech protections). 
 129 See Fact, GOOGLE DICTIONARY, http://googledictionary.freecollocation.com/meaning?word=fact 
(last visited May 10, 2018). 
 130 See Fact, DICTIONARY.COM, http://www.dictionary.com/browse/fact (last visited Mar. 23, 2018). 
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Darbi, of New York, has no steps in her apartment, but she notes that dachs-
hunds have a litany of medical issues as they age.  Lisa thinks that dachs-
hunds’ small size makes them ideal pets for urban living, particularly in cities 
that have rules about pet size.  And Patrick, who grew up in Minnesota with 
two black labs, thinks dachshunds are too small to run with humans.  Jim, 
Patrick, Lisa, and Darbi leveraged facts to make their argument about dachs-
hunds.  But the facts they chose—the ability to run up and down stairs, med-
ical vulnerabilities, size, and speed—varied.  Their values, what kinds of 
things are important for their evaluation of what “best” means, determined 
the facts they brought to the table. 
There is a difference, too, between, on the one hand, facts and disagree-
ments about those facts, and, on the other, our feelings about facts and disa-
greements about those feelings.  I thought BB-8, the droid from Star Wars: The 
Force Awakens, was interposed into the film using CGI technology.  My twelve-
year-old nephew thought otherwise.  We checked.  We were both a little right 
and a little wrong.  BB-8 is real, and the real robot device was placed in many 
of the scenes during shooting.  The scenes were also touched up and enhanced 
using CGI.131  My nephew and I had a disagreement about a fact, much like 
when a friend and I wondered if David Letterman’s mom is still alive.132  We 
either did not remember facts or never knew them in the first place. 
 Feelings about facts are different.  Many people were disheartened, even 
angry, about the fact that Donald Trump became president in January 2017.  
But that many people disapproved of his election did not change the fact of 
his victory.  Democrats and Republicans disagreed not about the fact, but 
about their feelings about the fact: whether Trump’s election was a good 
idea, whether it was motivated by racism and sexism and xenophobia, and 
whether the country can survive his agenda.133 
	
 131 See, e.g., Sean Hutchinson, How Puppeteers Brought BB-8 to Life in ‘Star Wars: The Force Awakens,’ 
INVERSE: ENTM’T (Apr. 6, 2016), https://www.inverse.com/article/13909-how-puppeteers-
brought-bb-8-to-life-in-star-wars-the-force-awakens (explaining that BB-8’s movement in the film 
was a product of both computerized special effects and an actual robot controlled by humans in 
various capacities). 
 132 She passed away in 2017.  See Chloe Melas, David Letterman’s Mom, a Staple of His Late Night Show, Dies 
at 95, CNN (Apr. 12, 2017, 10:52 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/04/12/celebrities/david-let-
terman-mom-dies/index.html (“David Letterman’s mother, Dorothy Mengering—who was known 
for her spots on his late night show—has died.”).  
 133 Fake news erodes all of these social processes.  Websites that traffic in lies make it impossible to 
check when two people disagree about basic facts.  And fake news radically distorts our feelings 
about facts and our values.  If a widely-shared article states that Hillary Clinton used the back room 
of a pizza parlor to run a pedophile ring, it is difficult to determine the truth when two people 
disagree about and want to confirm or challenge that statement’s veracity.  The presence of that 
false statement of fact in an article made to look like real news also corrodes popular impressions 
about Hillary Clinton, in general. 
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So facts, feelings about facts, and values are distinguishable.  Which, if 
any, are meant to be tolerated in the marketplace of ideas?  The intellectual 
tradition underpinning the marketplace of ideas was never concerned about 
truth or falsehood of basic facts.  Rather, as Frederick Schauer has argued, 
Milton, Mill, Holmes, Brandeis, and others were primarily concerned about 
ideas and values.  Schauer notes that Milton wrote the Areopagitica, in which 
he stated that “who ever knew Truth put to the wors, in a free and open en-
counter”134 as a challenge to censorship, in reaction to the British govern-
ment’s refusal to let him publish The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce, a pamphlet 
calling for liberalization of divorce law.135  When he used the word “truth,” 
he was not referring to truth about facts—that dachshunds are a breed of 
dog—but rather about ideas (about divorce), about which he thought his were 
“truer,” or better than others’.  Schauer argues that, even beyond Milton’s 
self interest in getting his pamphlet published, his writing could not have been 
about factual truth in law.  After all, the law governing falsehoods—fraud and 
defamation, for example—was “rudimentary” to nonexistent at the time.136  
Nor were facts and falsehoods part of the free speech tradition that grew 
in the centuries after Milton.  Schauer points out that the seditious libel cases 
in England and in the American colonies focused almost exclusively on crit-
icism, insult, and satire.137  Truth was not even a complete defense.138  
Throughout this time, the push for greater speech and press freedom—a 
larger, freer marketplace—was about the right to criticize the monarch.139  It 
was never suggested that such freedom also included a right to lie and have 
those lies accepted as legitimate contributions to discourse.  A close reading 
of John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty also reveals that his defense of the marketplace 
of ideas extended only to values and feelings about facts, not statements that 
are demonstrably false.  Consider his examples.  For Mill, it was wrong to 
suppress discussion of “open questions of morals,” matters of “ethical con-
viction,” “doctrine,” “belief in a God,” and “religious opinions,” generally.  
Indeed, as Schauer notes, Mill stated explicitly that liberty of thought applies 
	
 134 MILTON, supra note 30, at 167. 
 135 See Frederick Schauer, Facts and the First Amendment, 57 UCLA L. REV. 897, 902–03 (2010) (explain-
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 136 Id. at 903. 
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to “morals, religion, politics, social relations, and the business of life.”140  
Facts were not included. 
Justices Holmes and Brandeis, arguably the most important proponents 
of the marketplace of ideas in the American legal tradition, evidenced a sim-
ilar focus on ideas and advocacy, not facts.  Abrams, Whitney, and Gitlow v. New 
York,141 where Holmes and Brandeis joined on another dissent that invoked 
the marketplace of ideas,142 were about advocacy for the overthrow of the 
government.143  Schenck v. United States concerned debate about the World 
War I draft.144  Demonstrably false statements were not part of this jurispru-
dence, or of its intellectual tradition. 
The marketplace of ideas was always meant to be a marketplace of ideas, 
not facts.  There is no marketplace in facts.  Indeed, no area of law permits a 
market in facts.145  In fact, the goal of fake news is to create one, to erode the 
stability of foundational elements of society—namely, truth.  And the reflexive 
application of a First Amendment metaphor that never contemplated a de-
bate over truth and falsehood to demonstrable lies is complicit in the corrosion 
of the body politic brought on by fake news.  In this way, tolerating the pro-
liferation of fake news erodes the free and open debate that the First Amend-
ment was intended to protect: If we cannot agree on the veracity of basic facts, 
debate stops, partisanship hardens, and social solidarity breaks down. 
CONCLUSION 
Fake news is a problem for all of us.  Democracy is under threat when 
the truth is no longer a check on power.  As such, we all have a role to play 
in fighting back against the influence of fake news.  But current interpreta-
tions of the First Amendment make that difficult.  I have shown that the mar-
ketplace of ideas metaphor has metastasized far beyond its original incarna-
tion, and far beyond reason.  Its power as a governing principle of First 
Amendment law is equally enormous.  That is regrettable.  Facts, like gravity, 
are not up for debate; only our impressions or feelings about them are.  To 
suggest that demonstrably false statements of fact cannot be removed from 
the body politic, especially given their corrosive effects on the very freedom 
the First Amendment is meant to protect, bastardizes the First Amendment 
and its marketplace metaphor.  It makes little theoretical or doctrinal sense 
	
 140 MILL, supra note 32, at 34, 71, quoted in Schauer, supra note 135, at 905. 
 141 268 U.S. 652 (1925). 
 142 Id. at 672–73 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 143 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 359 (1927); Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 654 (majority opinion); Abrams 
v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 617 (1919). 
 144 249 U.S. 47, 48–49 (1919). 
 145 Facts are not copyrightable, for example.  Some modicum of originality is required to put facts in 
the marketplace.  See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 344 (1991) (stating 
that “facts are not copyrightable”). 
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for the First Amendment to stand as a barrier to legal interventions against 
fake news, at least to the extent that such a barrier is justified by the related 
marketplace and contact-neutrality doctrines.  Rather than reflecting a 
hands-off approach, tolerating fake news is a normative choice, one that ben-
efits powerful, moneyed interests who crave power no matter the cost. 
 
